Ruto’s Ruthless Strategy: Why Gachagua’s Political Days Are Numbered

I once said, you cannot defeat your enemy by using his own strategy against him. Ruto understands this principle well. He knows that had Uhuru acted swiftly, managing him when the time was ripe, he wouldn’t have risen to claim the highest office in the land. Uhuru’s failure to clip Ruto’s political wings early is a lesson that has not escaped Ruto’s mind—a lesson he is now applying. Politically, Ruto is keenly aware that Rigathi’s infrastructure is far weaker compared to what Ruto himself had under Uhuru’s regime. The partnership between Uhuru and Ruto was forged in near-equality—political titans who shared experience, influence, and a robust parliamentary presence, with URP and TNA holding power in complementary proportions.

In today’s reality, UDA is a ship tightly under the command of one captain—William Ruto—while Rigathi, like many others, is but a pillar whose strength is questionable at best.

In contrast, the strengths Ruto enjoyed under Uhuru are the exact weaknesses that Rigathi Gachagua finds himself saddled with under Ruto. Ruto didn’t pick Rigathi for his strengths; he selected him for his limitations. He sought a deputy who would remain loyal, obedient, and politically insignificant—a follower, not a contender. Ruto bypassed seasoned politicians to appoint a first-term MP, not because of any exceptional skill, but because Rigathi lacked the clout to pose a challenge. Some speculate that Rigathi’s financial contributions paved his way to the deputy seat, but in truth, his only real advantage is his ethnic identity, hailing from the Kikuyu, Kenya’s most populous community. This is why Rigathi clings to the “watu wetu” narrative like a lifeline—his political survival hinges not on his abilities, but on the strength of his ethnic base.

Ruto is all too aware that striking now means striking while the iron is hot. If he deals with Rigathi today, he allows himself ample time to handle the fallout and shape Rigathi and others into external enemies rather than internal threats. This way, he avoids the trap of letting a potential adversary fester within his own ranks. Ruto learned this from Uhuru’s failure to act swiftly, and he knows that waiting too long to deal with Rigathi would be akin to waiting for the storm to hit instead of bracing for it in advance.

Perhaps Ruto’s greatest disappointment with Rigathi has been the latter’s desire to mimic Ruto’s own style as Deputy President—a role in which Ruto wielded considerable influence, at times almost as much as the president himself. Rigathi seems to have forgotten that his appointment was based not on his potential strengths, but on the very weaknesses that were meant to keep him subordinate. He was chosen to be a loyal lieutenant, not a rival for power.

Ruto’s strategy is clear: by removing Rigathi now, he creates the space to groom more loyal and pliable allies in Mt. Kenya before it’s too late. The die has been cast; they have crossed the Rubicon. Ruto is ready to face the consequences, knowing full well that a house divided cannot stand. He will not sit back and watch his empire crumble from within. In his eyes, it is better to pluck out a festering thorn now than to allow it to grow into a greater threat later.

By Fwamba NC Fwamba